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CARRINGTON, COOLEY, KENNEDY, KLARE
Patrick 0. Gudridge*
Duncan Kennedy's A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Sicle1
("Critique") appears in this Article in a crowd. I begin by briefly
discussing Paul Carrington's book, Stewards of Democracy, and
proceed to examine at greater length some writing of Thomas
Cooley.' At this point the Kennedy book shows up, followed soon
after by Karl Klare's essay on the Wagner Act.' This grouping
assists appreciation of distinctive elements in Kennedy's version of
the idea of legitimation (the off-puttingly similar notions of the
nineteenth-century conservative theorist Cooley are especially
provocative). It also helps identification of work remaining to be
done after Kennedy (here parts of Klare's study serve as
springboards).
I.
Paul Carrington begins Stewards of Democracy by
proclaiming his belief in "democratic law."5 "[I]n a world in which
erratic absolutism and brutal chaos are the viable alternatives to
self-government, a great deal depends on our ability to make
government by the people work .... 6 This is the job of the
American lawyer: "to stabilize an otherwise fragile social order"
while remaining "of the people, not over them."' The key to this
project, Carrington argues, lies in lawyerly acknowledgement that
"sound, useful legal ideas are generally conventional ones."8
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1 DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SItCLE (1997)
[hereinafter CRITIQUE].
2 PAUL CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION
(1999) [hereinafter CARRINGTON, STEWARDS].
3 See infra Part III.
4 Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origin of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
5 CARRINGTON, STEWARDS, supra note 2, at 1.
6 Id. at 6.
7 Id. at 1, 6.
8 Id. at 183.
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Too often, however, judges become caught up in "heroic"
conceptions of their office,9 and legal academics-often influential
in defining the expectations of lawyers-assert the priority of
"theoretical scholarship."'" "Rarely is recognition given in
academic literature to the role of law as a confirmation of
conventional morality and as a message of reassurance to the good
citizens who do the Republic's work .... ,"11 Professor Carrington
devotes much of his book to identifying and celebrating
counterexamples; Louis Brandeis, Ernst Freund, Learned Hand,
and Byron White figure prominently. For Carrington, though,
Thomas Cooley is the lawyer whose work most obviously
exemplifies "law as a public profession." Cooley-dean of the
University of Michigan Law School, justice and chief justice of the
Michigan Supreme Court, author of the celebrated treatise
Constitutional Limitations, and first chair of the Interstate
Commerce Commission-was "among the last Jacksonians, but
also among the first Progressives."' 3 In all his efforts, Carrington
contends, Cooley appreciated the concomitants of "a broadly
representative legal profession," the obligation to be faithful to
both "text" and "discernible contemporary mores.""
"[D]emocratic law must reflect the commonplace ideas of the
people . ... ,, "
Paul Carrington finds one moment in particular in Thomas
Cooley's long public life to be precisely illustrative. Harvard
University, in the process of celebrating its 250th anniversary in
1886, awarded Cooley an honorary degree:
[Cooley] spoke briefly at a dinner in Hemenway Gymnasium,
along with Justice Holmes... and Dean Langdell. With
appropriate modesty, Cooley saluted the Harvard Law
School .... But he spoke in terms unsettling to those present:
[W]e fail to appreciate the dignity of our profession if
we look for it either in profundity of learning or in
forensic triumphs. Its reason for being must be found
in the effective aid it renders to justice and in the sense
that it gives of public security through its steady
support of public order. These are commonplaces, but
the strength of law lies in its commonplace character;
9 Justice Brennan is Carrington's example-in-chief. See id. at 147-51.
10 Id. at 191; see also id. at 185-92.
11 Id.
12 See id. at 121-29 (discussing Brandeis); id. at 131-36 (discussing Freund); id. at 137-
43 (discussing Hand); id. at 193-203 (discussing White).
13 Id. at 100.
14 Id. at 56-57.
15 Id. at 33.
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and it becomes feeble and untrustworthy when it
expresses something different from the common
thoughts of men.
That utterance stated a guiding premise of Cooley's
career.... Nevertheless, its assertion at Harvard almost surely
offended his host, Christopher Columbus Langdell ....
Cooley's remark also struck Justice Holmes with sufficient
force that he was moved to respond.., in 1902, four years after
Cooley's death. On that occasion, Holmes called forth "the
lightning of genius" to correct the failings of the "common
thoughts of men."' 6
Holmes and Cooley embody Carrington's thesis:
Is the law an expression of the popular will and moral
judgment, or is it an opportunity for a higher class of intellect to
impose benign government on a passive people?... While
Holmes deserves neither credit nor blame for the merit or
demerit of the explosive messages of later professionals
regarding themselves as geniuses of the law, he was in a sense
the herald of twentieth-century lawyers and judges who would
see themselves as agents of the politics and morality of a new
ruling class.
Cooley, unlike Holmes, was genuinely modest in his
intellectual pretensions. He believed and taught that a great
mind cannot by its own exertions create new principles of
morality or law....
... [I]t is the reassurance law gives to conventional,
responsible men and women, and the direction it gives to those
who are confused or uncertain, that makes law so useful that it
is universal among human societies. 7
II.
There is an element of topsy-turvy here. Professor Carrington
concedes that Holmes as a legal writer pursued an enterprise too
complex to be readily reduced to "heraldry" on behalf of any
single notion. 8  In particular, Carrington acknowledges the
democratic message of the famous dissents in the United States
Supreme Court that Holmes wrote years after Cooley's speech,
although he depicts democracy for Holmes as secondary, following
from fatalistic skepticism or detached indifference. 9 The Common
16 Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted).
17 Id. at 35, 37.
18 See id. at 35-45.
19 See id. at 40-41; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Law," however, is not much in evidence in Stewards of
Democracy, even though its publication date was just a few years
in advance of Cooley's visit to Harvard. The Holmes masterpiece,
we might think, is distinctly democratic "lightning." In addition to
challenging Kant and Hegel, The Common Law starkly
illuminated the anachronisms and inertias organizing much of the
common law, repeatedly opened up traditional topics to
contemporary "policy," and revealed the overlapping agendas of
judge-made common law and legislated statutes, entirely denying
common law any claim to priority.2
What of Thomas Cooley? Is his work simply that of a
"worthy yeoman," precisely and only "an expression of the
Jacksonian tradition"?22 Or can we also glimpse the influence of a
"theoretical scholarship"?23  In writing about Cooley, Paul
20 O.w. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press
1963) (1881). Carrington briefly discusses The Common Law in an article version of his
account of Cooley. See Paul Carrington, Law as "The Common Thoughts of Men": The
Law-Teaching and Judging of Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 49 STAN. L. REV. 495, 525 (1997).
21 Carrington judges The Common Law to be most notable for its "lofty style" and
"Delphic expressions." Carrington, supra note 20, at 525.
22 CARRINGTON, STEWARDS, supra note 2, at 23, 47.
23 Holmes, it appears, thought that Cooley and he were engaged in something like the
same enterprise. Holmes wrote this letter to Cooley on September 22, 1882:
As you have introduced Mr. Waples's Proceedings in Rem to the world I
think I need not apologize for writing you a line in regard to it. It seems to me
clear that he has made free use of an article of mine "Primitive Notions in
Modern Law" 10 Am. Law Rev. 422 which was the foundation of Chapter 1 of
my book on the Common Law without a word of acknowledgement. It is not
merely that he takes for his starting point ideas which I have no reason to doubt
were original with me and which I spent much time and labor in stating and
proving but that the citations which I gathered from various sources occur in
such wise as to earmark the indebtedness to my mind.
I am very glad that my work which is directed to the establishment of
general principles only, should assist those who are engaged in making text
books. But as my work is of a kind that is naturally known mainly to scholars, I
think such assistance should be acknowledged. I write to you, whose name will
secure the book a respectful treatment, to ask if there is any explanation to be
made.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, Reel 30 (0203-0214) (1985). Cooley responded
briefly on October 2: "Your letter rec'd & has been referred for consideration to Mr.
Waples." Id. Why didn't Holmes write directly to Waples? Why, if he didn't write to
Waples, did he write to Cooley instead? Cooley, Holmes said, had "introduced Mr.
Waples's Proceedings in Rem to the world" and as a result he, Holmes, "need not
apologize" for asking Cooley "if there is any explanation" for the evident plagiarism. Id.
But wouldn't Waples know better than Cooley (who in fact simply passed the Holmes
letter on to Waples)? Did Holmes think that as endorser Cooley was warrantor of the
originality of Waples? Perhaps it was not just that Cooley was famous. Waples, at least
according to Holmes, belonged to the class of "those who are engaged in making text
books." Id. Holmes, of course, saw himself differently. How did Holmes see Cooley?
Did his "name" impose upon Cooley an obligation to be familiar with Holmes's work? If
so, that "name" must have stood for more than "making text books." Id. Cooley, as
Holmes saw him, must have-like Holmes-belonged to the class of "scholars," concerned
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Carrington starts from, and elaborates upon, the work of historians
who have emphasized the impact upon Cooley's thinking of
Andrew Jackson supporters-especially the "Barnburners" of
upstate New York, Cooley's home in his youth.24 However usual,
there is something jarring about this juxtaposition of Jackson and
Cooley. "Respectable opinion," it appears, was never "aghast"
after reading Cooley-Jackson's message explaining his famous
Bank veto, by contrast, struck Nicholas Biddle (to be sure, the
head of the Bank of the United States) as the written equivalent
"of a chained panther biting the bars of his cage,.., a manifesto of
anarchy-such as Marat or Robespierre might have issued. ' 25 It is
certainly true, as Carrington and others show, that elements of the
Jacksonian political language survived the Civil War, and became
a part of postbellum jurisprudence. "Equal protection," for
example, was a phrase put to use in Jackson's veto message as well
as in the Fourteenth Amendment.26  The extraordinary events
subsumed in this passage of time, however, also obviously
influenced interpretation of Jacksonian principles. In Cooley's
work in particular, we will shortly see that democracy-centrally
Jacksonian in Jackson's own time-figured as an equivocal and
analytically marginal notion, and that judges-originally
Jacksonian foils-occupied a central role, however conventional
their language. Thomas Cooley emerges, I think, as a complicated,
intellectually challenging conservative, both too subtle and too
pointed to be anyone's "worthy yeoman. ' 27 His jurisprudence also
foreshadows Duncan Kennedy's.
On May 5, 1879, Cooley began a series of six lectures at Johns
Hopkins University (arguably the very point of origin of organized
"theoretical scholarship" in America) addressing the topic of
"with the establishment of general principles." Id. If so, Cooley should have "naturally
known" Holmes's work and (presumably) spotted the Waples borrowing. Id. Thus the
letter's implicit question: Why hadn't Cooley read Holmes?
24 See CARRINGTON, STEWARDS, supra note 2, at 15-23; Carrington, supra note 20, at
504-11. For other illustrations of this view, see, for example, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER,
COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 249, 258-59, 265 (1997); Alan Jones, Thomas Cooley and
"Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967).
25 CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-
1846, at 326 (1991); Letter from Nicholas Biddle to Henry Clay, quoted in id.
2( See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1848, at 388 (Sean Wilentz ed., 1992).
27 The intensely felt conservative strain in Cooley's writing-his anxiety in the face of
disorder-is perhaps most apparent in his responses to Reconstruction, in particular to
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Privileges and
Permissions: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 8 LAW & PHIL. 83 (1989); see also supra note 25.
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"Evils in Local Government. '28 Cooley titled the first lecture "The
Sentiment of Equality in American Politics." "To usefully lead an
age as statesman," he observed:
[O]ne must be of it; must recognize its prevailing ideas and
Sentiments, and take note of and respect such obstacles as these
present to any great and sudden change. If the age is not yet
prepared for his ideal, he will content himself with what is
practical and attainable instead of forcing upon it something
which could be better if voluntarily accepted.29
This is, standing alone, very much in the Carrington vein. But
Cooley's lecture overall was a critique of the influence in politics
of "Sentiments" in general and the "Sentiment of Equality in
American Politics" in particular. "It is no doubt wise to take
notice of prevailing sentiments, and utilize them in government so
far as may be practicable, but reason and the teachings of
experience must have the first place."30  "Sentiment," Cooley
believed, had especially led "reason captive" and into "folly" in
functioning as the motive force behind recent extensions of the
right to vote.31 He observed:
Suffrage ... is a birthright. The poor have the same right to it
as the rich, the ignorant as the educated, and indeed there can
be no distinction any where except as crime may be made to
28 These lectures, well known to students of Cooley, can be found in handwritten form
in box 7 of the Thomas M. Cooley Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of
Michigan [hereinafter Hopkins Lectures]. For Professor Carrington's discussions, see
Carrington, supra note 20, at 530-31, 535.
29 Hopkins Lectures, supra note 28. Cooley made his point at length:
The government must be suited to the age, to the people, and to the
circumstances of the people; and when these are ignored, the punishment of
folly must necessarily follow. A savage does not become a statesman by mere
acceptance of the Christian religion, neither can an unlettered freedman become
wise in matters of government by the mere force of a constitutional amendment.
It may be political wisdom under some circumstances to trust either the one class
or the other with privileges he does not as yet fully understand, but time has a
mission to perform in educating him in the trust, and what shall come of the
experiment before the training is completed must always be a subject of
solicitude and anxiety.
Id. at 21-22. He was careful to note, however, that considerations of "policy" apart from
sentiment might justify granting the right to vote to former slaves:
[P]articipation in suffrage is necessary for the protection of those who, by reason
of the want of special means of influence which property confers would in
various ways be at a disadvantage, and might be discriminated against by
unequal laws and thereby wronged and oppressed.... The circumstances of the
country and of its politics made the appeal on this behalf irresistible, and an
experiment conceded to only a choice between two great evils was entered upon.
Id. at 27-28. Cooley's principal concern was instead immigrant voting. "The Sentiment
that America was to be the asylum of the oppressed of all countries has been one which
the nation from its birth has cultivated with care and assiduity." Id. at 28.
30 Id. at 41.
31 Id.
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forfeit it. To formulate this proposition a little differently,
every man has a right to participate in the government of the
State even though his participation would render government
impracticable, and the good of the community must be
subordinated to this right in the individual, whatever may be
the consequences. As this proposition is baseless in reason it is
not surprising that it proves mischievous in practice. It is as
plainly the right of the State to exclude from suffrage all whose
participation would preclude a successful government as it is of
the citizen to participate in the blessings of government. 2
Cooley, at Johns Hopkins anyway, started from a notably
restricted notion of democracy, believing:
The fundamental purpose of any government is to give to the
people who come under it the benefits of order by means of
law. Every government therefore exists for the advantage of
those who are governed, and any advantage to those who
32 Id. at 40 (emphasis added). Cooley noted the emergence of a countersentiment,
whose origins he carefully described without endorsing (he depicted himself as a partisan
of "reason and the teachings of experience"). Id. at 41. He describes this
countersentiment as follows:
Another sentiment bearing little resemblance to those already mentioned,
begins to find expression somewhat vaguely in the wider current of American
politics. We allude now to the feeling of distrust of and contempt for republican
institutions, which is manifested in some quarters. This makes its appearance
mainly among the following classes of voters:
1. Men of intelligence who desire good government, and who think
they ought to have influence in proportion to their intelligence
and integrity, but who find on the other hand that the parties
intent on their own interests have more power.
2. ....
3. Those who, in view of various circumstances, among which may
be mentioned the unsettled condition of some portions of the
Country since the war, the want of harmony between races now
living intermingled and with equal political authority, and the rise
of Communism in some sections, have come to believe that a
greater exertion of discretionary executive authority is needed at
times than is now permitted by strict construction of
constitutional principles.
4. That class of persons in politics who are mere followers of party
leaders in caucuses and conventions... and who being
accustomed to autocratic rule in parties, come at length to regard
it as proper, and to think of popular government by management.
With all these classes respect for the expression of popular sentiments in
the accustomed legal modes diminishes, and with those who have property or
who hope lawfully to acquire it, distrust of the ability of republic institutions to
furnish property with adequate security increases. At length the faint
foreshadowing of the "man on horseback" looming up in the near future
becomes a familiar and not unpleasant object.
Id. at 49-52. Concerning the reference to "Communism," see generally PHILIP M. KATZ,
FROM APPOMATTOX TO MONTMARTRE: AMERICANS AND THE PARIS COMMUNE 161-83
(1998) ("1877: The Rise of the American Commune?").
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possess and wield its authority must be merely incidental and
not the purpose for which they govern."
These propositions did not determine the precise form of
government.34 He continued:
Even the existence of great discontent, such as now exists in
Russia, would not necessarily prove that the government should
be displaced; for it may still seem probable that the existing
authorities would better preserve order and give to the people
protection of rights than those which would be likely to succeed
them in the event of a revolution.35
The perspective here proceeds from an angle plainly distinct from
that of Jacksonian democracy. Popular sentiment, with respect to
any particular matter, possessed no special status for Cooley. It
was, therefore, either of benefit or harm to government depending
upon the circumstances.36
III.
It is mostly because of his work as a treatise writer that
Thomas Cooley acquired fame. Paul Carrington concludes that
Constitutional Limitations," the 1868 book that first brought
Cooley national attention, succeeded because it "command[ed] the
trust of its users as an accurate account of the law."38 Cooley's
cardinal virtue was humility. "To write such work, authors must
eschew novel thoughts and to that extent disavow not only
academic status seeking but the more immediate satisfactions of
self-expression."39 Cooley the treatise writer was of a piece with
Cooley the judge-he was simply "describing the actual conduct of
judges."4
Indeed, Cooley himself similarly noted that he had "faithfully
endeavored to give the law as it had been settled by the
33 Id. at 2.
34 Cooley was not impressed by strong notions of popular sovereignty:
The only theory recognized in our government is that... Civil Government has
its origin in the agreement of the people.... In this Country, so far as concerns
government under our existing constitutions, it has a basis of fact sufficient for
practical purposes, though it may be and is generally true that a large portion of
the people have never consented to the government in any form except as living
under it implies assent.
Id. at 8.
35 Id. at 10-11.
36 See id. at 9-10.
37 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION (reprint 1999) (1868) [hereinafter COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS].
38 CARRINGTON, STEWARDS, supra note 2, at 184.
39 Id. (citation omitted).
40 Id. at 71; see also id. at 76-77.
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authorities, rather than to present his own views."'" He aimed to
do no more than state "clearly and with reasonable
conciseness ... the principles to be deduced from the judicial
decisions. '4 2 It is not clear how much weight we should give to
claims of modesty from the author of a six-hundred-plus-page
treatise, a work in this case mostly written in a tone of surpassing
confidence, written by an author who had served as a judge for
only three years and had taught for less than a decade.
Regardless, Cooley's modesty underscores this question: how do
the "authorities" reach their "decisions"? There is no elaborate
account of adjudication in Constitutional Limitations. In his last
major treatise, however, the Law of Torts, published in 1880,
Cooley began with an extended discussion of "The General Nature
of Legal Wrongs," embedding a theory of judging within a larger
theory of law and society.43 As in his Johns Hopkins lecture, "The
Sentiment of Equality in American Politics"-delivered at about
the same time-Cooley treated public opinion as a problem to be
managed, clearly not the expression of some Jacksonian general
will.
Initially, Cooley called attention to the by-products of
progress:
The increase in intelligence, and especially the new inventions
and improvements which follow it, have a powerful tendency in
the direction of creating new wants and desires, and of
establishing people in new occupations, and as these increase,
the interests, desires and passions of men must necessarily
breed more frequent controversies. Moreover, every
recognition by the law of a new right, is likely to raise questions
of its adjustment to, and its harmony with, existing rights
previously enjoyed by others; and in consequence thereof
people in the honest assertion of their supposed rights are
brought in conflict, and one or the other is found to be
chargeable with legal wrong, though no purpose has existed to
do otherwise than strictly to obey the law.44
The legal system therefore comes under pressure:
Intellectual and material progress in various ways begets a
complexity of business and social relations, and this adds
perpetually to the difficulties of legal administration, and
multiplies with no little rapidity the occasions for an
41 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 37, at iii.
42 Id. at iv.
43 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 1-22 (reprint 1993) (1880) [hereinafter
COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS]. Professor Carrington notes this discussion briefly. See
Carrington, supra note 20, at 497, 525.
44 COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 43, at 1-2.
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adjudication upon disputed or doubtful rights. And it renders
necessary an infinity of legislation in order to adjust and
harmonize the new conditions with what remains of the old.45
Frequent legal change seemed to Cooley to put at risk the
capacity of law to fix popular attitudes (Cooley writes here with
almost Orwellian elegance):
But where rights are defined and regulated by durable laws,
respect and obedience become habitual, and there is at length a
spontaneous conformity of action thereto which deprives the
numerous restraints of the law of all seeming hardship that
might have been felt originally. The restraints come to be
understood and appreciated in their true character as being
severally the representatives of rights secured and protected,
and the feeling they give is one of security rather than of
restiveness and oppression. The restraints and the liberty of the
people will progress together, so that the restraints will be most
numerous where rights are most fully recognized and most
perfectly protected; and if the laws are impartial, even peculiar
privileges which fall to the possession of the few will be
cheerfully acquiesced in by the many, because they will be
granted on a consideration of what is best for the whole
political society, so that though the few may receive the direct
benefit, all others will be supposed to receive incidental benefits
sufficient to justify the grant of such privileges.46
Common law, described by Cooley as "judicial legislation,"47
manages legal change in a way that minimizes any threat to the
appearance of "durable" order:
[R]ights have grown up under judicial regulation, and through
judicial definition, much more than under legislation properly
so designated. The code of to-day is therefore to be traced
rather in the spirit of judicial decisions than in the letter of the
statute. The process of growth has been something like the
following: Every principle declared by a court in giving
judgment is supposed to be a principle more or less general in
its application, and which is applied under the facts of the case,
because, in the opinion of the court, the facts bring the case
45 Id. at 2.
46 Id. at 10-11.
47 He explains further:
But in order that [the common law] may be continuously useful the progressive
changes must be great and numerous, so great and so numerous that it could
only be by the most enlarged intendment that the law of to-day could be
recognized as the common law of even the time of Lord Coke. In fact, its
principles now depend very largely on a species of judicial legislation which from
time to time, as new conditions were found to exist, has endeavored to fit and




within the principle. The case is not the measure of the
principle; it does not limit and confine it within the exact facts,
but it furnishes an illustration of the principle, which, perhaps,
might still have been applied, had some of the facts been
different. Thus, one by one, important principles become
recognized, through adjudications which illustrate them, and
which constitute authoritative evidence of what the law is when
other cases shall arise. But cases are seldom exactly alike in
their facts; they are, on the contrary, infinite in their diversities;
and as numerous controversies on differing facts are found to
be within the reach of the same general principle, the principle
seems to grow and expand, and does actually become more
comprehensive, though so' steadily and insensibly under
legitimate judicial treatment that for the time the expansion
passes unobserved. But new and peculiar cases must also arise
from time to time, for which the courts must find the governing
principle, and these may either be referred to some principle
previously declared, or to some one which now, for the first
time, there is occasion to apply. But a principle newly applied is
not supposed to be a new principle; on the contrary, it is
assumed that from time immemorial it has constituted a part of
the common law of the land, and that it has only not been
applied before, because no occasion has arisen for its
application. This assumption is the very ground work and
justification for its being applied at all; because the creation of
new rules of law, by whatsoever authority, can be nothing else
than legislation; and the principle now announced for the first
time must always be so far in harmony with the great body of
the law that it may naturally be taken and deemed to be a
component part of it, as the decision assumes it to be. Thus a
species of judicial legislation, proper and legitimate in itself,
because it is absolutely essential to a systematic adjudication of
rights, goes on regularly, and without interruption .... 48
Judicial legislation is thus, for Cooley, to be preferred to
statutory change:
In this steady and almost imperceptible change must be found
the chief advantages of a judicial development of the law over a
statutory development; the one can work no great or sudden
changes; the other can, and frequently does, make such as are
not only violent, but premature. A large share of the value of
any law consists in the habitual reception and the spontaneous
obedience which the people are expected to give to it, and
which they will give when they have become accustomed to and
understand its obligation. The people then may be said to be
their own policemen; they habitually restrain their actions
48 Id. at 12-13.
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within the limits of the law, instead of waiting the compulsion of
legal process. A violent change must break up, for the time
being, this spontaneous observance, and some degree of
embarrassment is always to be anticipated before that which is
new and strange becomes habitually accepted, and its
advantages appreciated, and before that which remains of the
old is adjusted to it.49
If it is "principles" and not decisions as such that matter most
in "judicial legislation," we may wonder whether Cooley's
professed intention in his Constitutional Limitations to "state
clearly... the principles to be deduced" was so humble after all.
His Harvard mention of "the sense that [law and the legal
profession] gives of public security" also acquires an added
dimension-"commonplaces" now figure as a front for intricate
governance. Thomas Cooley's Law of Torts, like his Johns
Hopkins lecture, is surprising work. The preoccupations and
emphases are plainly not Paul Carrington's. Cooley, in fact, seems
to celebrate a process very much like that described in Duncan
Kennedy's Critique.
IV.
What should we make of that? It is not a question of
anticipation. Some of Thomas Cooley's ideas are just different
enough, I think, to call attention to a difficulty in Duncan
Kennedy's use of the idea of legitimacy.
The adjudicatory mechanics that Critique describes has, as
one of its effects, a "reinforcement and reproduction of a
particular attitude or 'sense' about the social world."5
[T]he particular set of hierarchies that constitute our social
arrangements look more natural, more necessary, and more just
than they "really" are.... [Aliternative ways of understanding
are rendered invisible or marginal or seemingly irrational by the
practice of withdrawing a large part of the law-making function
into a domain governed by the convention of legal correctness
and the denial of ideological choice.51
Adjudication appears to be a background institution, one source of
the framework or context "within which" foreground political
struggles take place.2 Adjudicative results-for example, common
law-therefore do not ordinarily look like "a major cause of
49 Id. at 15.
50 CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 236.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 243.
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inequality."53 "The legitimation hypothesis is that this limitation of
the political imagination is good for the status quo.
54
What is "the status quo"? Kennedy posits the existence of a
"set of hierarchies that constitute our social arrangements.""
Cooley, however, is less sure of his surroundings, instead
perceiving what Kennedy calls "flux."56  Social circumstances
appear to Cooley to present recurring risks of disruption or
disintegration. Law as well, in its own content, is at points
incomplete or unjust; the case for revision is often clear enough
that the question of means recurs. The argument for judicial
change, as opposed to legislation, is that the relative invisibility of
judicial action will do less to add to unrest, to the general sense of
unsettlement. Cooley would probably have rewritten Kennedy's
proposition that adjudication "reenforces the status quo,"57 to read
"reinforces the status quo"; Cooley would have appreciated the
implicit military and construction metaphors. He would not (I
think) believe that this is the same thing (as it seems to be for
Kennedy) as "reproduc[ing] the status quo."58
So what? If Cooley is right, adjudication, by filling the void,
preempts legislation and the possibility of more radical, less ad hoc
legal change. This is the same result that Kennedy's legitimacy
produces.
I am not so sure. Kennedy seems to suppose that the results
of adjudication are, in detail and in the aggregate, pretty much
patternless 9 Judicial work approximately reproduces a status quo
(allowing for moderate conservative and moderate liberal
variations); there is not much to be learned from a close reading of
judicial opinions themselves, either individually or in quantity.
There is no reason to believe, for example, that organizing judicial
opinions is a useful way to learn anything more than the rough
outline of social preoccupations. Individual judges, Kennedy
would perhaps agree, might exhibit flashes of insight. But most
53 Id.
54 Id. at 246.
55 Id. at 236.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 247.
58 Id.
59 He writes:
The liberal legalist investment in Reason sometimes pays off in knowledge that
is useful beyond the project, that has as much 'truth value' for conservatives or
radicals as for its liberal inventors. But the knowledge the liberal legalist project
produces is not much help with these questions. We might define the project as
a particular strategy for shoring up rightness, principle, and rights so that it will




judicial work will mostly reflect the interaction of stylized elements
("bites" of various sorts), time constraints, and the like. There is
no reason to suppose, therefore, that opinions disclose anything
other than the techniques of writing opinions; just as the playing
out of a game reveals nothing more than some of the implications
of the game's rules. These conclusions hold within Kennedy's
argument, however, only for readers who know something of the
rules of the game. Uninformed readers believe that the opinions
reveal esoteric insight into the structure of circumstances or
society-hence the legitimating effect. Those who know how to
read understand that what they read is just an allegory of writing;
those who do not know how to read believe that what they read
describes the world.
60
Cooley seems to suppose that judicial opinions mostly pass
unnoticed in the world at large. Indeed, they do their work within
his politics precisely to the extent that this is so. Issues that would
add to social conflict if politically prominent, or if subjects of
legislation, never come to public attention because judges address
them case by case. But this means, I think, that within Cooley's
account, the content of judicial opinions does matter. He
distinguishes cases in which judges simply reiterate what is already
established from cases in which something new is needed either
because there is no previous judicial analysis available or because
previous work is now no good. Informed readers, at least in
principle, should be able, as Cooley does himself, to distinguish
between the two sorts of cases.6' It becomes possible, therefore, to
build up a map (or at least candidate maps) of interconnected
problems-the potential subjects of the legislative action that
Cooley means to preempt. What this means, I think, is that an
ever present fragility is part of Cooley's project. Nothing in
principle bars legislatures from map-making, from proposing
large-scale changes exciting still further critique.
60 Kennedy need not assume that the public at large reads (and respects) judicial
opinions. But he must suppose that participants in the legislative process (including the
electoral process insofar as it frames legislative issues) do so. In this respect, his analysis
parallels famous arguments of Henry Hart. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
61 Cooley's discussion of the fellow servant rule provides an especially clear
illustration. See COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 43, at 541-45. Usual assumption of
risk notions seems to have struck Cooley as not persuasive; he instead supplies a complex
passenger safety rationale which, however persuasive, is notable for its considerable
(although not total) independence of prevailing judicial rationalizations. On the usual
perspective and its difficulties, see, for example, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 209-10 (1977); Gary T. Schwartz,
Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE




In his 1873 edition of Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on
the Constitution, Cooley had already posed the question:
What is "the law of the land?" It cannot be the common law
merely. Statute law is in the highest sense the law of the land;
and the legislative department, created for the very purpose of
declaring from time to time what shall be the law, possesses
ample powers to make, modify, and repeal, as public policy or
the public need shall demand. Such being the case, the question
presents itself, whether any thing may be made the law of the
land, or may become due process of law, which the legislature,
under the proper forms, has seen fit to enact?62
Here is his answer:
[L]ife, liberty, and property are placed under the protection of
known and established principles, which cannot be dispensed
with either generally or specially; either by courts or executive
officers, or by legislators themselves. Different principles are
applicable in different cases, and require different forms and
proceedings: in some, they must be judicial; in others, the
government may interfere directly and ex parte; but due process
of law in each particular case means such an exertion of the
powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of
individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases
to which the one being dealt with belongs.63
But what if "the settled maxims of law" were themselves open to
critique? He responds:
A party has no vested right in a rule of law which would give
him an inequitable advantage over another; and such rule may
therefore be repealed and the advantage thereby taken away.
... But it cannot be necessary to go more particularly, in
this place, into an enumeration of the cases in which the
legislature may change a rule of law in order to take away a
remedy which, resting upon mere technical reasons, it might be
unjust to insist upon; or to perfect a remedy which otherwise
might have been defeated. The rules which determine the
legislative power in such cases are broad rules of right and
justice; and it is not often, when there is occasion to apply them,
62 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1943 (4th ed. 1873) (notes and additions by Thomas M. Cooley) [hereinafter
COOLEY'S STORY]. Cooley's principal "additions" addressed-not surprisingly-the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. See id.; see also COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 37, at 353-54.
63 COOLEY'S STORY, supra note 62, § 1945 (emphases added). For a very similar
formulation, see COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 37, at 355-56. In
his edition of Story's Commentaries, Cooley acknowledged that he was borrowing his own
prior wording. "We have been unable to give a comprehensive definition which shall be
more accurate." COOLEY'S STORY, supra note 62, at 665 n.1.
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that there can be difficulty in discerning plainly the line of
constitutional limitation.64
We may wonder how we are to distinguish "mere technical
reasons" from "broad rules of right and justice" if "different
principles are applicable in different cases, and require different
forms and proceedings." Cooley declares-confidently or
prayerfully? -that "there can be no difficulty in discerning plainly
the line." We all remember, of course, what will follow: Justice
Peckham in Lochner v. New York 5 obsessively worrying about the
prospect of the police power becoming an illimitable "delusive
name";66 Holmes (also in Lochner) chanting "[g]eneral
propositions do not decide concrete cases";6" Chief Justice
Hughes, in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,68 redrawing "the line,"
observing that "[t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract," and that "the restraints of due process" plainly
encompass "protection from unscrupulous and overreaching
employers. "69
The particular conception .of legitimacy that Duncan Kennedy
deploys trades heavily on a depiction of judges as alienated labor."
It is as though "reasoned elaboration" is a factory product; as
though Ford or Taylor had read Hart and Sacks. Judges faced
with time constraints, dockets, and fellow judges to be persuaded
assemble opinions from prefabricated parts in ways that conform
to already established models allowing only limited opportunity
for variation. It is not that the opinions must, in the abstract, be
put together in this way-it is possible to imagine Hercules
reconceiving a jurisprudence as a whole, seeking some "best"
account of the law. This is just not what the work is ordinarily like.
Paul Carrington, interestingly, reaches much the same conclusion:
Most opinions of a court are written defensively. They tend to
disavow personal responsibility for the political consequences
of the decisions they defend. One need not be a judge to
recognize the prudence of attributing one's unwelcome
decisions to others, preferably some abstract other, such as "the
64 COOLEY'S STORY, supra note 62, §§ 1957-58. "[T]he term 'vested rights' is not used
in any narrow or technical sense, as importing a power of legal control merely, but rather
as implying a vested interest which it is equitable the government should recognize, and of
which the individual cannot be deprived without injustice." COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, supra note 37, at 358.
65 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
66 Id. at 56.
67 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
68 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
69 Id. at 391, 398.




law" or "the rules" or "management." Moreover, this style of
disavowal serves to remind judges that they have professional
duties to restrain their personal impulses, that indeed the law is
not theirs to shape to their own desires.71
Carrington here seems to agree with Kennedy that judging is an
example of Sartrean "denial," "misrepresentation ... of oneself as
a machine ... as factoid, or mechanical."" It seems to me, though,
that judicial work as Kennedy in particular describes it is alienated
labor even if judges acknowledge to themselves that the
"experience of constraint by the text" is "a sometime thing, always
unpredictably subject to dissolution by legal work."73 Whatever
"particular work strategy"74 individual judges adopt, the work is
always one version or another of assembly-arrangement and
rearrangement of parts, organization and reorganization of "rules"
and "policies." If this is their job, judges "as workers"75 can never
regard the opinions that they produce as "theirs" in any deep
sense.
This means, of course, that judges, at least within Kennedy's
account, are often also alienated readers as well as writers.
Opinions will appear to judges to be just assemblages, seams
discernible-hasty or otherwise incomplete efforts. Should other
readers view judicial work from this perspective? Kennedy
describes "delegitimating critiques" as precisely adopting the point
of view of the working judge in order to dissolve the "appearance
of inevitability" by moving "legal rules" from "background" to
"foreground."76 The aim of this project, Kennedy says, is to show
"that there are more ways to change the status quo than previously
appeared."77 But why doesn't such effort, at least once past the
momentary thrill of the gestalt shift, simply reproduce alienation,
the sense of legal work as parts-assembly? If that is not supposed
to be the result, if the point is to show the possibility of a politics
other than busywork, something other than, or in addition to,
parts-work must be discernible in judicial opinions. Cooley's
account suggests that readers may attempt to discover the issues or
questions that, once interconnected, reveal the larger legislative
projects that Cooley sees judges as (hopefully) obscuring. His own
usage, however, is no longer especially helpful insofar as it relies
on what are supposed to be irreducibly general gap-filling policies
71 CARRINGTON, STEWARDS, supra note 2, at 70 (emphasis added).
72 CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 205.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 181.
75 Id. at 180.




or maxims aimed at supplanting so-called technical terms. This is
a jurisprudence that parts-work replaced.
V.
So what is to be done? There are, I think, other options.
It is helpful, for present purposes, to reconsider a
"foundational" example of delegitimation work (in its critical legal
studies ("cls") form): Karl Klare's Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act."8 Klare-famously-dramatized the larger theme of
his article by pointing out the extent to which Chief Justice
Hughes, in his opinion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,7 9
manifested "adherence to traditional contractualist ideals," merely
"updating" and therefore "preserving the freedom of contract
ideal."8 This was and still is, we all know, simply brilliant. Jones
& Laughlin is usually understood oppositely, as perhaps the
exemplary illustration of New Deal constitutional and legal
modernity. Klare engineered his reversal of ordinary expectations
by repeatedly playing with assumptions about background and
foreground-according priority to the more obscure Jones &
Laughlin due process discussion rather than the well-known
interstate commerce rhapsody, and, more importantly, reading the
opinion as a description of labor law biases rather than
constitutional law assumptions. Klare precisely put to use the
sensitivity to the place of parts-work in adjudication that Duncan
Kennedy expounds. Kare himself is clear on this (concluding his
discussion of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB81 later in the article):
A microcosm of modern legal consciousness, Phelps Dodge
contained a chaotic amalgam of conceptualism and realism,
ruleboundedness and ad hoc balancing, deference to nonjudicial
sources of law and unhesitating faith in the superiority of the
judicial mind. This jurisprudential m6lange transcended
political lines and attitudes as to whether the proper judicial
role is one of activism or restraint. I believe that all of modern
legal consciousness partakes of this hodgepodge character. 82
Still, however correct Karl Klare is in characterizing Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Phelps Dodge (I will return to this
question shortly), there remains, for the reader of Jones &
Laughlin, a sense of something missing. This sense, I think, finds
its point of departure in passages that Klare finds no need to quote
78 Klare, supra note 4, at 265. For Kennedy's characterization, see CRITIQUE, supra
note 1, at 400 n.13.
79 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
80 Klare, supra note 4, at 298, 300 n.115.
81 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
82 Klare, supra note 4, at 334-35.
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and that are in the middle of the paragraph in Jones & Laughlin
that he uses to drive his own argument. This is the outline of the
paragraph as a whole:
The Act does not .... It does not .... It does not .... The
Act expressly provides .... The theory of the Act is .... As
we said... the cases of Adair... and Coppage... are
inapplicable to legislation of this character. The Act does not
interfere .... The employer may not ... and, on the other
hand, the Board is not entitled .... The true purpose is the
subject of investigation .... It would seem that .... 83
Klare quotes the first three sentences, does not quote the next
three, quotes the seventh and eighth, and omits the ninth and
tenth. 4 Moderation in quotation is surely no vice. And it plainly
is not the case that the omitted sentences contradict Klare's own
contention. The organization of the paragraph as a whole,
however, notably emphasizes multiplicity of point of view. There
is the Act and the Supreme Court in its past decisions; there is the
employer and the Board, neither depicted as decisive; there is the
point of view of the Jones & Laughlin opinion itself: "It would
seem that .... " Klare collapses this superstructure. We notice
only what appear to be the biases of the Jones & Laughlin opinion
itself. And, of course, they are the opinion's biases. But the artful
arrangement of alternate perspectives, we know, is just as much
the opinion's. Indeed, in the discussion of interstate commerce,
Hughes proceeds similarly, albeit across a longer length:
Respondent says .... The argument rests upon the proposition
that manufacturing in itself is not commerce.... The
Government distinguishes these cases. The various parts of
respondent's enterprise are described .... It is urged that these
activities constitute a "stream" or "flow" of commerce....
Respondent contends that the instant case presents
material distinctions....
We do not find it necessary to determine .... The
instances in which that metaphor has been used are but
particular, and not exclusive, illustrations .... The question is
necessarily one of degree....
It is thus apparent that the fact that the employees here
concerned were engaged in production is not determinative."
In this sequence, propositions that might otherwise be presented
as fundamental constitutional notions-indeed, treated as such
83 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 45-46.
84 See Kare, supra note 4, at 299.
85 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 34-40.
8552001]
CARDOZO LAWREVIEW
before Jones & Laughlin-are recharacterized as arguments of
parties. The artifice of one party's "position" (the government's)
is further emphasized by calling attention to its metaphorical
base; 6 this sense of artifice in turn makes "apparent" the element
of judgment and choice; "the fact" that the employees in the case
"were engaged in production" can therefore be both
acknowledged and treated as similarly (just like the metaphor)
"not determinative."
So what? Am I arguing only that Charles Evans Hughes
deployed another kind of parts-work, originating in a familiar
lawyerly awareness of point of view, that he must have been
conscious of what he was doing, and that, therefore, perhaps like
Thomas Cooley, he was a not quite so constrained activist? No.
What is most distinctive about the Jones & Laughlin opinion, I
think, is caught by the phrase, "[t]he theory of the Act," in the
paragraph that Karl Klare also puts to work. Hughes executes a
gestalt shift of his own. Jones & Laughlin situates its readers, first
and chiefly, within the Wagner Act:
First. The scope of the Act....
Second. The unfair labor practices in question....
Third. The application of the Act to employees engaged in
production....
Fourth. Effects of the unfair labor practice in respondent's
enterprise....
Fifth. The means which the Act employs. -Questions under
the due process clause and other constitutional restrictions.87
Indeed, it is because the opinion first describes the statute and
emphasizes how its provisions key its applicability to a finding, in
particular cases, as to whether matters at issue are matters
"affecting commerce," that the opinion concludes that the
constitutional issues are to be assessed within the context of "the
instant case." The facts about the scale of the Jones & Laughlin
enterprise, as Chief Justice Hughes artfully assembles them, make
the Commerce Clause question appear to be easy.88 The statute
frames the constitutional question and thereby effectively resolves
it.
86 For a well-known and very different discussion of metaphor in Jones & Laughlin,
see Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1199-1206 (1989).
87 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 29, 32, 34,41, 43.
88 See id. at 25-28.
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In the discussion of due process, perhaps similarly, the
opinion repeatedly characterizes "traditional contractualist ideals"
as statutory elements. Is the statute free to fix its own conception
of contract, to focus contractual analysis just as it focused
constitutional inquiry? 9 We know, of course, that Chief Justice
Hughes had already answered this question in the affirmative, just
before Jones & Laughlin, in his opinion in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish." Indeed, he had made much the same point several years
earlier in Home Building &, Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.9 Common-
law notions, just like constitutional notions, were subject to
legislative specifications of emphasis." The important question
becomes: what choice did the legislature make? This
reformulation is, for Karl Klare's immediate purposes,
unnecessarily refined. His concern is the particular content of the
choices that the Supreme Court attributed to the Wagner Act, and
not whether the Court understood this content as first common
law or first statutory. Sensitivity to the formal ordering of statutes
and common law, however, ultimately fosters awareness of a
jurisprudence, and therefore a politics, that Klare and Duncan
Kennedy tend to obscure.
"There is no ... general common law."93 After reading Jones
& Laughlin, I think, we can conceive of the possibility of a "theory
of the Act" that would not only substitute its own emphases for
usual conceptions of interstate commerce, but would also put in
place its own versions of common-law concepts. Indeed, in cases
decided during and just after the period that is the focus for Karl
89 Thus there were three possible approaches within the common law/legislation
interplay. Common-law notions could be understood to constrain or even dictate
statutory language-substantial legislative departures from common-law notions would be
regarded as arbitrary. Statutes could be understood to be free to ignore or dispense with
common-law vocabularies. Or third (this is the possibility that Kennedy's argument itself
highlights), common-law framings might be understood as unresolved, as themselves
frequently and substantially varying; legislatures, therefore, might be understood to
possess a considerable freedom of choice even in advance of reaching the question of
whether statutes might entirely repudiate common law propositions.
90 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
91 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
92 Courts would acknowledge such specifications often in the 1940s. See, e.g., Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1944); Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
93 Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). It is not misleading, I think, to
delete the word "federal." It was, after all, the collapse of the notion of general common
law, and the simultaneous recognition of the controversial political uses of general
common law-of more or less the same body of law emerging everywhere-that created
the environment within which the Erie rule seemed to make sense as a matter of sound
judging, and within which the Swift v. Tyson rule seemed constitutionally to resemble
nothing if not a judicial coup d'etat. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS
AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION (2000).
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Klare, the Supreme Court repeatedly debated the question of the
place of common-law terms within federal statutes.94
Phelps Dodge,95 the last Wagner Act case that Karl Klare
discusses, was one site of this controversy. Justice Frankfurter's
nominal majority opinion96 appears to Klare to be both "[a]
microcosm of modern legal consciousness" and "a chaotic
amalgam "97-a clear illustration (we might think) of what Duncan
Kennedy leads us to expect. But both parts of the opinion that
Klare persuasively criticizes 98-the passages (1) requiring the
NLRB to explain once more its reason for ordering reinstatement
of workers now employed elsewhere, and (2) ordering the Board
to enforce the mitigation doctrine full force-rest on the same
ideas. First, the Wagner Act is not itself decisive. "Unlike
mathematical symbols, the phrasing of such social legislation as
this seldom attains more than approximate precision of
definition."9 9  No particular resolution of the matters at hand,
therefore, are "mechanically compelled by the Act."'' °  Second,
"[a] statute expressive of such large public policy.., must be
broadly phrased and necessarily carries with it the task of
administrative application.""1 1 This "administrative process will be
best vindicated by clarity in its exercise."'0 2 This meant for Justice
94 The best known of these decisions also involved the Wagner Act. NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), held that, even though the Act included no express
definitions, the meaning of the statutory term was not to be judged in light of common law
standards. Refusing, in strikingly Erie-like terms, to try to identify a "pervading general
essence distilled from state law," the Hearst opinion declared that "it cannot be irrelevant
that the particular workers in these cases are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the
evils the statute was designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are appropriate
for preventing them or curing their harmful effects in the special situation." Id. at 122, 127.
To be sure, the Hearst opinion did not carry its own analysis to conclusion, "distilling" a
statutory "essence" as it were. The "public right" notions according priority to the NLRB
that are an important additional subject of Klare's critique, already implicit in Jones &
Laughlin in the depicted opposition of employer and Board, reappeared in Hearst in the
form of a policy of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation. See Hearst, 322
U.S. at 130-32. But the idea of "the theory of the Act" is plainly just as important in
Hearst as NLRB priority. The Taft-Hartley Act followed in short order. A congressional
shotgun blast fired at the NLRB-the statute included, inter alia, a specific repudiation of
Hearst's approach to the definition of employees, mandating a return to common-law
conceptions. See Allied Chem. Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 165-68 (1971).
95 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
96 The Supreme Court at the time consisted of eight justices. Justice Roberts did not
sit for Phelps Dodge. See id. at 200. Justices Murphy, Black, and Douglas dissented. See
id. at 200-08. Justice Stone and Chief Justice Hughes dissented in part. See id. at 208-12.
97 Klare, supra note 4, at 334.
98 See id. at 327-35.
99 Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 185.
100 Id. at 198.
101 Id. at 194.
102 Id. at 197.
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Frankfurter that the NLRB must "disclose the basis of its order" in
terms "making workable the system of restricted judicial
review. '"03 It also meant that the NLRB could not use "[s]implicity
of administration" as a reason for not closely examining the
capacity of workers to mitigate damages.""' In reaching its "final
judgment," the Board's process, like that of any "civilized legal
system," must "tak[e] fair account.., of every socially desirable
factor."' 105
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Phelps Dodge is a harbinger,
specifically, of the postwar Administrative Procedure Act (already
proposed in Congress) and, more generally, legal process
jurisprudence. 106 It was not a reassertion of common-law order but
rather reconceived law as a mechanism for maintaining order by
shifting emphasis away from questions about the sources and
stability of substantive legal norms to questions of institutional
(prototypically judicial) requirements and ethics. But this
rearrangement required, perhaps just as much as the older
common-law regime, that statutes figure only peripherally.
Frankfurter's opinion proceeded accordingly. It is perhaps not
surprising that the other Phelps Dodge opinions treated the
Wagner Act terms as central. Justice Stone relied chiefly upon the
wording of particular provisions that appeared to indicate that
wrongly discharged workers who had obtained employment
elsewhere, and wrongly hired job applicants, were not statutory
"employees."' 0'7  Justice Murphy stressed the statutory
responsibility of the NLRB to gauge and enforce "the policies of
the Act."'0 8 Linking institutional ethics with statutory substance,
he wrote, "[i]t is not our function to read the Act as we think it
should have been written, or to supplant a rule adopted by the
Board with one which we believe is better."09
Karl Klare addresses the question of "the theory of the Act."
But it is not the Wagner Act itself that he reads mostly. Except for
some references to "Findings and Policy" included in the first
section of the Act, he looks to "labor law cases and literature.""0
In this respect, at least, his approach parallels that of Justice
103 Id. at 196-97. "From the record of the present case we cannot really tell why the
Board ordered reinstatement of the strikers who obtained subsequent employment." Id.
(emphasis added).
104 Id. at 198; see also id. at 198-200.
105 Id. at 198.
106 See Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L.
REV. 219 (1986).
107 See Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 209-11 (Stone, J., dissenting in part).
108 Id. at 206 (Murphy, J., dissenting in part).
109 Id.
110 Klare, supra note 4, at 281.
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Frankfurter. "The theory of the Act" looks like a marginalized
third term, neither common-law concepts nor administrative
procedure. To be sure, within the approach that Klare adopts and
that Duncan Kennedy generalizes in Critique, this deemphasis is
readily explained. Statutory interpretation is easily interpreted as
just another form of adjudication-more ad hoc parts-work. "' In
any case, the idea of "the theory of the Act," closely considered,
does look odd. What does it mean for "the Act" to theorize?
People theorize-say, judges, legislators (maybe), or
academics-not documents. "The theory of the Act" is an
anthropomorphism, figurative language not far different from
"stream of commerce" rhetoric.
VI.
It may be a mistake, however, to reach this conclusion too
quickly. Duncan Kennedy's depiction of the "chaotic amalgam"
(Karl Klare's phrase) judicial opinions beget obtains at least some
of its plausibility, we may suspect, from several presuppositions. It
helps, for example, if judges routinely issue a very large number of
opinions, addressing more or less similar legal questions.
Kennedy's account also benefits if opinions are (relatively) easy to
read, and free from (much in the way of) formal constraint. It
becomes less difficult, and seems to be more revealing as well, to
pick out the arrangement and rearrangements of standard
elements ("bites" or parts work) that for Kennedy are
characteristic of the substance of the opinions. Critique may trade,
therefore, on aspects of our responses to judicial opinion-writing
that are not so obviously part of the project of reading and writing
legislation. Statutes are-vis-A-vis particular topics at least-
relatively infrequent within given legislative jurisdictions (and it is
almost always only with respect to particular topics and within a
given jurisdiction that statutes are read)."2  Statutes are-we
ordinarily expect-difficult to read. This is in part a consequence
of their length. It is even more so a result of their extreme
stylization. It is plain that the content of statutes, whatever that
may turn out to be, derives precisely from the arrangement,
111 See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
112 Notwithstanding a few celebrated attempts, and the well-known arguments of
Roscoe Pound and James Landis, the idea that statutes would figure collectively as a new
kind of-or new contribution to-common law did not take hold. See James Landis,
Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS (1934); Roscoe Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
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rearrangement, presence, absence, or other variation of more or
less standard elements.
Statutes may be infrequent, lengthy, and both difficult and
formulaic in style at least in part because their wording is
canonical-always the point of departure, not just one version
among many. It is surely also relevant that statutes require the
approval of relatively large numbers of individuals before
enactment. In the legislative process itself, statutory drafts may
figure as representations-as registries and therefore organizers of
(or at least departure points for) the politics of the moment.'13
Statutes remain representative after passage as well. Their
function, simultaneously jurisdictional and substantive, is the
depiction of circumstances, in terms identifying both facts and
norms, that authorize and inform executive or judicial acts. The
mechanics and uses of statutes-this is my main point-conjoin
form and content. "Every form of rule is the precipitate of a social
conflict-it consolidates the distribution of power corresponding
to its outcome." '114 In the case of statutes, Elias's dictum becomes a
provocative pun. "Rule" is both hegemony and writing.
Statutes matter because they are treated as governing models.
The effect of judicial opinions, in contrast, is to an important
degree independent of their exact wording-at least apart from
their concluding orders. It is possible to wonder, therefore,
whether in the course of reading statutes, in the course of
identifying and interpreting legislative assemblies, we might
glimpse something other than what (little, Kennedy argues) we
gather from reading judicial opinions. Statutes, precisely because
of the way they differ from opinions, might retain the potential of
marking lines of conflict, of making explicit what is enforced, what
is left unresolved or compromised, and what is taken for granted
within a politics not necessarily the same as-perhaps writ larger
than-the politics of adjudication. This hypothesis, we have seen,
was Thomas Cooley's worry. It asserts the possibility that
changing the first subject of critical attention-from judicial
opinions to statutes-might open an inquiry falling outside the
domain of Duncan Kennedy's dismissal."5 Adjudication would
113 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 77-82 (1999).
114 NORBERT ELIAS, THE COURT SOCIETY 146 (trans. ed. 1983) (1969).
115 There is another option. We might treat the proper norms-those that ought to
inform legal instruments-as originating in the experience and efforts at resistance of
persons who seem, in some systematic or structural way, to be exploited or otherwise
badly treated. This is, of course, one point of departure for feminist legal writing and
Critical Race Theory, as well as other similar projects. The same approach has also been
put to use within a class-based framework. For an especially evocative illustration drawing
on the Jones & Laughlin dispute, see Ken Casebeer, Aliquippa: The Company Town and
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remain relevant, of course, but would now become secondary.
Judicial responses to statutes might be understood as possessing an
additional dimension, as sometimes treating statutes as changing
terms of analysis and sometimes denying or minimizing any such
statutory change. These responses might, in the aggregate, reveal
no arresting pattern (Kennedy's hypothesis). The opinions would
remain, however, mineheads of a sort, sites for attempted
extractions of possible statutory scale, more or less difficult efforts
to describe concrete politics writ larger. Such attempts, like all
tries at escape, may not succeed every time. They would, however,
at the least challenge the claim of judges to title to their own
opinions (and through their opinions the statutes the opinions
expound). Jurisprudential direct action of this sort, in the end,
seems the next best step after Duncan Kennedy's Critique.
Contested Power in The Construction of Law, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 617 (1995). I do not mean
to criticize this often powerful way of proceeding. It may sometimes, however, run the
risk of putting aside the question of precisely how it is that legal materials considered
relatively abstractly-understood as spectacle as a version of artistic production, ordinarily
of a status quo-might be seized and reoriented, put to work-even if only intermittently
and not often free from challenge-in service of some other production.
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